Drawing up a medium term economic plan usually involves a complicated interaction between the planning ministry and representatives of the various industries, firms, or departments. Each economic agent works in his own environment with at best incomplete information about the other agents. Yet somehow the economic system as a whole is typically able to move toward an operational plan which is satisfactory even when judged by the criterion of complete information. This paper examines the properties of one particular theoretical model of economic planning in which the center transmits information via a system of quotas.
INTRODUCTION
BECAUSE MODERN technological processes are so intricate, it is usually expedient, in a large centrally planned economic organization, to delegate responsibility. Formal mathematical models have been constructed which verify the intuitive notion that under certain assumptions the need for completely centralized knowledge can be obviated. Convergence to overall optimality can be achieved, these models show, if an abbreviated amount of information is iteratively calculated by each economic agent and transmitted to the others in the form of a suitable index. In many theoretical procedures the prospective indices sent out by the center are prices, while those received by it are in the form of quantities. Here the reverse order will be incorporated into an algorithm of the simplex family.
Hopefully such a procedure may be useful as a computational device for dealing with large scale mathematical programming problems. While it is not really a difference of substance, here a somewhat greater emphasis will be placed on the role of this model as an abstract description of multilevel economic planning. In this context an algorithm which revolves around centrally prepared production quotas might be considered advantageous because they may be more appealing than price directives from a practical standpoint.
MOTIVATION
For many centrally planned organizations economic plans are prepared in accordance with the following rough format. As a result of past experience and a backlog of statistical information, the central planners possess an approximate but workable notion of the technological possibilities confronting the various individual production units of the economy. Combining this knowledge with their own planners' preferences, highly tentative sets of roughly consistent control the decision variables of the firm's production plan. For example, using a drill press to bore a particular block of steel in a specific way might be an activity. The level of the jth activity undertaken by firm k is denoted Vik (I = 1, . . , Jk). In our previous example, the activity level would be the number of such borings performed.
Production possibilities for firm k are limited by a scarcity of fixed factors (e.g., drill presses) and other restraints (e.g., nonnegativity). These are reflected by the set of inequalities (1) flk(vk, Yk) < 0 ({ = , . .,Lk).
Although we have chosen to represent them in mathematical form, the activity constraints are probably difficult to quantify and would at best be familiar only for "customary" activity levels.
The production set of all net outputs producible by firm k is denoted by Yk 3 Assumption (i) is familiar from resource allocation theory and Koopmans [6] should be consulted for an adequate discussion of its significance. We note here only that we are not requiring every operation performed within the firm to conform to the laws of decreasing or constant returns. We are merely presupposing that, together with possible decreasing returns in some operations, the "convexifying" effects of scarce fixed resources are strong enough to counteract the "deconvexifying" effects, if they are present, of increasing returns in other operations. Thus, the set of all vectors satisfying (1) need not be convex (if it were, we would not have to additionally postulate Yk convex). Assumption (ii) can be thought of as being due essentially to the finiteness of fixed factors specific to firm k (like bolted-down capital). Assumption (iii) merely permits free disposal of commodities. The last two assumptions could be weakened but it would complicate the exposition without adding, in my opinion, much of economic significance. 4 It is obviously beyond the scope of this study to examine the conditions under which collective choices can be properly quantified. In this paper it will simply be postulated that social choices are representable by a welfare function that the planners know. Other important difficulties, including the problems of intertemporal choice, aggregation, veracity, and implementation are likewise being ignored here.
' Interestingly enough, this algorithm does not require that the welfare function U() be concave or that the set X be convex. I do not understand the practical implications for economic planning of this unorthodox feature; perhaps there are none. 6 For the problem under consideration to be interesting we can neither assume a time period so short that the possibilities for substitution are negligible nor one so long as to warrant an explicit treatment of capital formation. (5) will possess an optimal solution with maximum attainable utility U* U(x*). While the problem (2), (3), (4), (5) has been cast in a national planning setting, it should be clear that other interpretations are possible. In fact, many other important problems can be so structured. Even within the national planning framework, the concept of a firm is meant to be quite general. International trade, for example, could be accommodated by postulating two extra firms or departments. One would be in charge of exports, "producing" foreign exchange by "consuming" commodities sold abroad. The other, in charge of imports, "consumes" foreign exchange to "produce" commodities purchased from abroad. "Laws of production" for such firms would reflect supply and demand conditions on world markets.
THE IMPORTANT CONCEPT OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
Managers specialize in handling their own firm's problems and as such are likely to be ignorant of the exact situation prevailing in other firms, of society's total available resources, or of the planners' preferences among net output possibilities. Nor can it be presumed that the managers of firm k are explicitly aware of the set Yk. It should not be forgotten that the production set or production function is an economist's concept of little or no direct relevance to managers or engineers.7 For the purposes of this paper, the difference is more than semantic. Going from the activity constraints (1) to an efficient boundary point of Yk involves the solution to a more or less difficult optimization problem. Under the circumstances it is hardly reasonable to suppose that even those closest to the operations of a firm know more than a small subset of efficient production points a priori. Nevertheless, in the sense that they could map out the relevant sections of Yk if they were asked to do so in an operationally meaningful way, the managers of firm k might be said to know it implicitly.
An analogous situation prevails at the level of the central planning agency. While the central planners can be considered to know explicitly the vector of available resources co and the set of acceptable consumption vectors X, they are not likely to be acquainted with social welfare in the same way. However, it is assumed that, perhaps after some introspection, they can operationally choose unambiguously among various alternatives of social net output. In this sense, the planners can be thought of as implicitly possessing a utility function, even though such a function probably could not be explicitly displayed a priori.
When it comes to any aspect of the activities {Vk} or the functions {Jfk( )} specific to the firms, the center is considered to be completely ignorant. It would be futile to try to solve (2), (3), (4), (5) directly by having each firm transmit the activity constraints (1). Even if it could be done, the resulting central problem would be of such overwhelming magnitude in the number of constraints and unknowns as to be essentially unsolvable. Nor would it do to have the firms report the more abbreviated production sets { Yk}. As we have noted, these are probably not known explicitly.
Despite their lack of precise knowledge, it would be unfair to characterize the central planners as being completely ignorant of the production sets. After all, they are aware of past performances, and having kept up with economic changes members of the central planning agency are more than likely to be acquainted with at least a broad picture of current possibilities. We denote by Y% the planners' estimate of the production set Yk. The elements of Yo are all those production possibilities that are not patently unrealistic but whose feasibility cannot be ascertained in advance of consulting the managers of firm k. 8 Formally, we assume that Y% is closed, bounded from above9 and that Yk ' Yo. If, for some reason, literally nothing were known about Yk, the planners could always choose Yo by fixing arbitrarily large positive bounds on the components of Yk-
A DECENTRALIZED PLANNING PROCEDURE
From what has just been said, it should be obvious that a workable planning algorithm cannot impose excessive informational requirements on any single economic agent. The approach taken here views the planning procedure as a learning process whereby the center iteratively comes to understand more and more exactly the relevant parts of the production possibilities sets without ever requiring any firm to transmit the entire set. The remainder of this paper exposits a method for automatically generating meaningful ys and 7cs, called the "production target procedure."10 6. THE PRODUCTION TARGET PROCEDURE Suppose that the production quota qk cannot be produced by firm k. Let Qk be defined as Qk {yly <, qkl. We say that a production point 9k iS efficient with respect to the quota qk, or qk-efficient, if 9k E Yk r Qk and if there exists a positive row vector Pk such that y E Yk n Qk implies pky < Pk9k
Roughly speaking, qk-efficiency can be interpreted as one way of formalizing the notion of a production combination for which the managers have gone as far as possible toward achieving their assigned but unattainable quota. It is a sort of Pareto optimality with respect to the production target. If 9k is a qk-efficient point it has the property that, if it is to remain producible, any component of 9k strictly 10 We say "a method" rather than "the method" because other approaches are certainly possible. Having experimented with some other methods, I can report that it would suffice to form a separating hyperplane from the optimal dual prices associated with minimizing any one of a variety of bona fide infeasibility forms or distance measures (distance, that is, from the infeasible point to points in the production set), of which the one selected for detailed study turns out to be a special case. Unfortunately, some otherwise plausible distance measures would probably not fare well as devices of administrative control. For example, it might be needlessly difficult for the manager of a firm to choose a production point which minimizes the Euclidean distance from the assigned quota simply because he has little understanding of what it means. This is why mathematical generality is abandoned at this time in favor of a particular idea which seems somewhat more plausible from an organizational viewpoint. A set of qk-efficient points is portrayed in Figure 2 . For the purposes of this paper, qk-efficiency is an important concept because it can serve as an intuitively appealing way of automatically generating a separating hyperplane which will cause the algorithm to converge. PROPOSITION 
It is not difficult to show that the vector Jtk from problem (11), (12), (13) is a set of prices dual to equation (16). An interpretation of (14), (15), (16) is as follows.
Suppose firm k can purchase commodities at fixed positive transfer prices Pk to help meet its assigned quota. The problem is to schedule production and arrange purchases so as to minimize the total "penalty cost" of fulfilling the target. Given this objective, 7Cik represents the worth or marginal product to firm k of an extra unit of commodity i.
The production target procedure as it pertains to the firms can now be precisely defined. If at stage s the quota qs is not producible, firm k reports back any qsefficient point ys and a price vector 7cs satisfying (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), whose existence is guaranteed by Proposition 1. In such situations we can, without loss of generality, normalize csk so that Z 1 7k = 1 (at least one component of csk must be positive from condition (ii)). The remainder of the production target procedure has already been formally described.
The procedure under study would not be of much interest if it did not, in some sense, move closer and closer to an optimum. While the convergence of each quota to a unique point is not to be expected under the circumstances, it is sufficient to require that each quota converges to its respective production set. Convergence of qS to the production set Yk means that if k is a limit point of the sequence {qk}, then qk E Yk. PROPOSITION Because 7lsys < 7csqs, the following must hold simultaneously for at least one component i: Tri = 0, ysk < qls, 7is > 0. Let ui be an n-vector with the ith component positive and every other component equal to zero. By the assumption of free disposal, the vector (yk -ui) belongs to Tk n Yk, but not to Ts, because 7(ykui) < 7csys, and a fortiori not to Ts n Yk Since there are only a finite number of facets for each production set and every stage calls forth at least one new facet, the procedure must terminate after a finite number of stages.13 7. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE PRODUCTION TARGET PROCEDURE So far no mention has been made of how best to select a separating hyperplane. Yet some choices will undoubtedly result in quicker convergence than others. Suppose that instead of in effect allowing the firms to choose at each stage any positive value for Pk in equations (11), (12), (13), it is instead selected for them by the center.
A natural choice might be the dual prices associated with equation (9) of the master program. Choosing p in this manner probably does not involve any extra work on the part of the center since the dual vector to equation (9) is likely to be automatically available as a by-product of the solution to the master problem (6), (7), (8), (9). The price received by all the firms would then be identical for a given commodity, reflecting marginal conditions throughout the economy in the limit as s approaches infinity, and approximating them before the limit is reached. Such prices would presumably help guide infeasible quotas toward feasibility in a way which would do minimal damage to overall utility, and for this reason the algorithm might be expected to be efficient. From a strictly computational or algorithmic viewpoint, the firms do not have to perform a more difficult calculation since they are already, in effect, optimizing for a value of p given implicitly.
Other possibilities readily suggest themselves. In a one product firm, the center might fix inputs at the quota level (by implicitly setting the prices of purchased inputs at very high values) and ask for the maximum attainable output. The opposite case is also conceivable-fix output at the quota level (by setting its price at an arbitrarily high value) and ask for that combination of inputs which minimizes the total cost of inputs over and above the alloted quota. Or, one could envision a procedure that assigned fixed quotas for some commodities (perhaps allocatable primary resources like labor) by implicitly setting high administered prices and allowed the firms themselves to choose all other purchases by minimizing costs of fictitiously imported commodities. The common denominator of all these variants is the use, whether explicit or implicit, of a price pk which is applied to excess demands over a target qk in order to elicit a marginal productivity assessment ik from the firms. '4 It may be of interest to contrast the production target approach with another model of decentralized planning which has been discussed in the literature. An algorithm first proposed by Dantzig and Wolfe [1] which was applied to an economic planning setting by Malinvaud [9, Section V] is an example of a type of procedure whereby the center approximates a production set by building it up from the inside, taking convex combinations of those feasible points which are recursively generated as part of the algorithm. The procedure presented here is dual to the Dantzig-Wolfe-Malinvaud (D-W-M) approach in several respects. Here the production set is reconstructed via tangent hyperplanes (rather than boundary points as with D-W-M) and the center becomes progressively less (rather than more) optimistic about attainable utility because the production possibilities sets revealed to it are continually being narrowed down (rather than expanded out). In the D-W-M procedure, the center announces prices and the firms respond with quantities; the reverse sequence is more nearly the case with the procedure presented here. '5 While a polyhedral production set can be described either as the intersection of half spaces formed by tangent hyperplanes or as the convex combination of extreme points, in more than two dimensions typically far fewer tangent hyperplanes than extreme points would be required. For this reason, at least in the case of polyhedral production sets, it might be hoped that the procedure presented here would converge in fewer stages than the D-W-M approach. From a programming point of view, however, the subproblem and perhaps also the master may be more difficult to solve in the production target procedure. 16 Although the production target algorithm has been shown to converge in the limit as the number of stages goes to infinity, any real life planning procedure must cease after a finite number of stages. In practice, the central planning agency could '5 It is possible to construct a "primal-dual" type of planning algorithm which combines certain features of the procedure reported on in this paper with some other characteristics of the D-W-M model. For each firm the center's initial approximating set would neither be required to contain the true production set (as with the current procedure) nor to be contained by the true production set (as with the D-W-M algorithm). Instead, there might be any kind of an arbitrary relationship between the two. The method for rectifying unproducible central quotas would be exactly the same as that of the present paper, and it would also lead to a contraction of the central estimating set via the addition of a constraint hyperplane. If, on the other hand, it turned out that the center had announced a producible quota, the firms would be instructed to report back a feasible profit maximizing production point (a " Yk =Yk n C Yo is all that the central planners could ever hope to learn is attainable anyway, since in our view firms are reluctant to make things more difficult for themselves by informing the center of inefficient targets.) The present "pressure" system, whereby the center distributes overoptimistic targets which the firms progressively whittle down to feasibility is believed to be a more relevant model for the institutional setting under consideration. 16 While both share in common a rough similarity in the message sequencing-quantities from the center and marginal products from the firms-this algorithm differs significantly from that proposed by Kornai and Liptak [8] . Their algorithm is based on the method of fictitious play, a successive approximations approach, whereas the production target procedure is based on programming considerations not unlike those underlying the simplex method. Also, the K-L approach works only for an objective function which is separable among the firms. probably call a halt to the proceedings whenever quotas were no longer overtight. For all practical purposes, this would undoubtedly be sufficient because in the real world the boundary of a production set is hardly an exact entity anyway. As far as the mechanics of the algorithm are concerned, the center could terminate at any stage by taking the best convex combination of previously proposed production points somewhat in the manner of the D-W-M approach. This would be the only time such a master problem would have to be solved. So long as at least one combination of previously proposed production points was feasible (which would, incidentally, also have to be the case for the proper operation of D-W-M), the utility attained as a result of solving the "termination problem" would have to increase monotonically with the number of stages. In the sense that realizable utility monotonically increases, the production target algorithm, with the termination modification just described, could be thought of as having one of the advantages usually attributed to a primal algorithm.
In an institutional setting, we would dispense with such an exact formalization as has been postulated here. The basic idea is that the firms must correct the center's exaggerated notion of their technology sets in a way that leads to convergence. Whether this is done by relaying one separating hyperplane or several, formal curvilinear surfaces or mere verbal descriptions, is not important so long as it achieves the desired effect of transmitting the true "terms on which alternatives are offered." The relevant feedback mechanism for the general case is flow-charted in Figure 3 .
Finally we note that although everything in this paper has been presented in terms of but two levels of organization, represented symbolically by the center and the firms, generalization to three or more levels is certainly possible. While it is not examined in the present paper, such an extension contains an interesting interpretation in terms of a quota system with telescoped command levels Cowles Foundation, Yale University
